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NEWSLETTER of October 16, 2026

The following content has been added at finexpert:


Studies > Performance

Boston Consulting Group
CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANKING REPORT 2026: A GOLDEN WINDOW FOR GROWTH
BCG expects the combined revenue pool of corporate and investment banks and non-bank financial institutions to reach approximately USD 1.1 trillion in 2026 and USD 1.39 trillion by 2030. Growth is shifting toward hedge funds and financial sponsors, requiring banks to strengthen coverage, financing and platform capabilities rather than rely primarily on traditional corporate clients. The report estimates that AI could release roughly 40% of middle- and back-office capacity by 2030, but argues that the benefit depends on end-to-end operating-model redesign and modular data infrastructure. For European banks, the analysis highlights the need to invest current earnings strength in scalable technology, digital-asset capabilities and differentiated client franchises before competitive advantages become harder to dislodge. >more

Studies > Performance

Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft
GREIX RENTAL PRICE INDEX Q3 2026: ASKING RENTS PICK UP AGAIN, EXISTING-STOCK APARTMENTS DRIVE THE TREND
Asking rents across the 37 German cities and regions covered by the GREIX increased by 1.2% quarter-on-quarter and 3.7% year-on-year in the third quarter of 2026. In real terms, rents rose by 0.3% from the previous quarter and 0.7% from a year earlier, marking the strongest quarterly increase since early 2025. Existing apartments drove the acceleration, with asking rents rising 1.2% quarter-on-quarter compared with 0.6% for new-build properties. Regional differences remain substantial: average cold rents range from EUR 23.7 per square metre in Munich to EUR 10.4 in Leipzig, against a 37-market average of EUR 14.6. >more

Studies > Corporate Finance

KfW Research
KFW-KREDITMARKTAUSBLICK OKTOBER 2026
New lending by German banks to domestic companies and self-employed borrowers increased by 3.4% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, the strongest rise since the end of 2022. KfW attributes much of the increase to energy-related liquidity needs and likely front-loading ahead of higher interest rates rather than to a broad investment upswing. Lending standards remain restrictive, with 40.5% of SMEs in credit negotiations reporting cautious bank behaviour and German corporate non-performing loans exceeding the euro-area average. KfW expects loan growth to slow to around 1.5% in each of the final two quarters as higher financing costs, geopolitical uncertainty and weak investment demand offset continued working-capital needs. >more

Studies > Alternative Investments

European Investment Fund (EIF) | Invest Europe
EIF EQUITY SURVEY Q3 2026
The survey of 682 European venture-capital and mid-market private-equity fund managers finds that sentiment weakened in the third quarter despite continued growth in fundraising and investment activity. Fundraising remains the largest challenge, with capital increasingly concentrated among established managers, later-stage funds and selected sectors. Deal flow and new investments remain positive on balance, while difficult exits and higher financing costs are increasing liquidity pressure on limited partners. Only 11% of managers report a portfolio company that generated at least the full value of a fund, and the report argues that the difficulty of identifying such winners ex ante reinforces the importance of diversification. >more


Research Papers > Corporate Governance

INCENTIVE REALIGNMENT: MUTUAL FUNDS’ INFLUENCE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
Vikas Agarwal, Sean S. Cao, Shawn X. Huang, and Min Kim
2026
Using a regulation that increased U.S. mutual funds’ portfolio disclosure frequency as an exogenous shock that shortened their investment horizons, we examine whether and how affected funds realign managerial horizons at portfolio firms. We find that firms respond by shortening executive pay duration. Funds induce this change through both voice and exit, voting on compensation issues and divesting. The effect is stronger for funds with lower trading costs, greater size, and stronger reputations, and for managers with stronger career incentives and fewer distractions. Our findings provide new evidence of dynamic incentive realignment by institutional investors. >more

Research Papers > Corporate Finance

LIABILITY MANAGEMENT’S LIMITED RUNWAY: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING TODAY
Mark J. Roe, and Vasile Rotaru
2026
Coercive, non–pro rata debt restructurings, often driven by private equity sponsors, have become a major force for fixing distressed companies. They are promoted—by stressed companies, their owners, their advisors, and favored creditors—as the best way to avoid bankruptcy and reduce financial stress, and thereby extend distressed firms’ runways to recover and take off. If true, these benefits would explain their growing frequency. But the post-deal results contradict proponents’ positive claims. First, a majority of coercively restructured firms end up filing for bankruptcy anyway—a letdown for a maneuver mainly justified as a way to avoid bankruptcy. Second, the winning participants typically take higher-priority debt rather than stabilizing equity, further undermining already overindebted structures. High debt levels and low credit ratings persist. The added capital complexity can prod the firm toward default and a potentially thornier bankruptcy. Third, efficiency justifications commonly offered—like avoiding bankruptcy’s expense—are doubtful. Coercive debt restructurings are themselves expensive, and many restructured firms end up in bankruptcy anyway, yielding two costly deals. Fourth, coercive restructurings are as consistent with redistributing value from disfavored creditors to owners and favored creditors as with efficient restructuring. When dealmakers redistribute value, they have less incentive to focus on stabilizing the firm’s finances and improving its operations. We present evidence supporting all four claims—nearly definitive for the first two, substantial although not ruling out alternatives for the second two. The evidence overall points to coercive recapitalizations’ potential to lock capital in poor investments for too long. From a lawyer’s perspective, that could raise troubling fiduciary-duty questions. From a market-wide perspective, inefficient deals and misallocated capital could eventually favor more effective contracts and deals. Rent seeking to grab value from other investors can persist despite its costs, but not always. >more

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